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Slater
SFN Regular
USA
1668 Posts |
 Posted - 09/05/2001 : 09:17:12 [Permalink]
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quote:
It appears that Japan had only the motivation to neutralize US sea power and had no interest in US territory. The plan was to cripple the Pacific Fleet, then while the US took significant time rebuilding, create a defensive circle of islands equipped with air fields to deter attack. The Japanese military was realistic in knowing that this defence would not indefinitely repel an eventual US counterattack. Japan was banking on making any such war so long and costly that the US would be forced to sue for peace. US involvement in the Pacific appears to me to have been caused by the fact that the two nations grossly underestemated each other.
The O.N.I. (who had broken the Japanese code) did not hold such an optimistic opinion. What you are describing is what Naval Intelligence thought was the Japanese fall back plan.(Or so I read in the files on really slow days) They considered the Southern California oil fields to be the prime target.
You have to remember the "public relations" that we had with the Japanese in the '50s and 60s. By 1970 you would have thought that we were the "bad guys" because we dropped 2 A- bombs. It only leaked out about the Fire balloons that attacked the Pacific North West with. And you still don't hear about the minor shore bombardment of Washington State.
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The brain that was stolen from my laboratory was a criminal brain. Only evil will come from it. |
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ktesibios
SFN Regular
USA
505 Posts |
Posted - 09/05/2001 : 12:33:20 [Permalink]
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quote:
Greg,
I didn't miss Garette's point. Even back then, Japan had no interest in helping Germany. Therefore, an attack into the middle east to get petroleum supplies would be rational.
They had no reason to go after Middle East oil. Once they had secured Borneo they had possession of oilfields adequate for their needs, which ultimately didn't do them much good because the U.S. did such a thorough job of wrecking their merchant shipping (around 50% of their tanker tonnage went to the bottom) that they couldn't get the oil from its source to their home islands.
By late 1944 their situation was that if they based warships in the home islands they could arm but not fuel them, and if they based them near the oilfields they could fuel them but not arm them.
The Japanese military was very weak on logistics to begin with; the U.S. Navy ultimately rendered them impotent to supply their fighting forces or even to supply their industries with the raw materials they went to war to obtain.
Even had they seized Middle Eastern oil resources they would just have faced an even worse transport problem.
Boris Karloff died for your sins. |
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Greg
Skeptic Friend
USA
281 Posts |
Posted - 09/05/2001 : 14:22:38 [Permalink]
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quote:
The O.N.I. (who had broken the Japanese code) did not hold such an optimistic opinion. What you are describing is what Naval Intelligence thought was the Japanese fall back plan.(Or so I read in the files on really slow days) They considered the Southern California oil fields to be the prime target.
I agree that destruction of the California oil fields would have been at least as devastating to US war preparedness as the attack on Pearl Harbor. The time to have attacked however would have been as soon as possible after Pearl Harbor while tha US navy was in disarray and underarmed. The pattern of Japanese threat to the US mainland early in the war was one of small operations of low risk. These were obviously designed to keep significantly more men and arms back in the US than necessary to repel a 'real' attack. The main targets of Japanese military policy in 1942 were to destroy the US carrier groups (the job left undone at Pearl Harbor) and to consolidate their defensive positions. Even the Aleutian Islands campaign was a diversionary manouver for the real target (Midway island). The Japanese wanted the US navy to believe that the mainland was vulnerable and it appears to have worked.
quote:
Even had they seized Middle Eastern oil resources they would just have faced an even worse transport problem.
I agree. Japan had overestimated it's industrial capacity to wage a large scale war in the same way it had underestimated the US' capacity.
Perhaps Garrette should have worded his question this way;
What military action by Japan would have been most advantageous to the German war effort?
Greg.
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Valiant Dancer
Forum Goalie
USA
4826 Posts |
Posted - 09/06/2001 : 07:53:51 [Permalink]
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quote:
quote:
Greg,
I didn't miss Garette's point. Even back then, Japan had no interest in helping Germany. Therefore, an attack into the middle east to get petroleum supplies would be rational.
They had no reason to go after Middle East oil. Once they had secured Borneo they had possession of oilfields adequate for their needs, which ultimately didn't do them much good because the U.S. did such a thorough job of wrecking their merchant shipping (around 50% of their tanker tonnage went to the bottom) that they couldn't get the oil from its source to their home islands.
By late 1944 their situation was that if they based warships in the home islands they could arm but not fuel them, and if they based them near the oilfields they could fuel them but not arm them.
The Japanese military was very weak on logistics to begin with; the U.S. Navy ultimately rendered them impotent to supply their fighting forces or even to supply their industries with the raw materials they went to war to obtain.
Even had they seized Middle Eastern oil resources they would just have faced an even worse transport problem.
Boris Karloff died for your sins.
It would be adventageous to attack in that basic vein to get the raw materials (a big reason to invade China besides the historical claims) needed to wage war. They also would want to sieze the petroleum fields of the middle east to prevent the allied countries (which were harrassing thier shipping) from getting it. Even if they just destroyed the wells, the war effort in several countries would be impacted. Most warships of the time were fuel oil boilered power plants. Cutting off a supply of oil could restrict the enemies operations which hampered Japan's war effort.
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Greg
Skeptic Friend
USA
281 Posts |
Posted - 09/06/2001 : 16:40:09 [Permalink]
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quote:
It would be adventageous to attack in that basic vein to get the raw materials (a big reason to invade China besides the historical claims) needed to wage war. They also would want to sieze the petroleum fields of the middle east to prevent the allied countries (which were harrassing thier shipping) from getting it. Even if they just destroyed the wells, the war effort in several countries would be impacted. Most warships of the time were fuel oil boilered power plants. Cutting off a supply of oil could restrict the enemies operations which hampered Japan's war effort.
There would be one big problem with this policy though. Oil was not discovered in the Middle East until the late 30's. It is very unlikely that oil sufficient enough to make a difference either way was being extracted there until after the war.
Greg.
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